Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

City of St. George v. PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION OF UTAH, MILLIE 0.
BERNARD, OLOF E. ZUNDELL and JOSEPH
C. FOLLEY, Commissioners of the PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH : Brief of
Petitioner
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
G. Blaine Davis; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for Respondents.
F. Robert Reeder; Joseph W. Anderson; Parsons, Behle, and Latimer; Attorneys for Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, City of St. George v. Public Service Commission of Utah, No. 14692.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1585

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IH 0. /
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

L

FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

RECEIVED
AW LIBRARY
I3JUNI977

* * * * * * *

» * t t vojac y r , ^ , y

CITY OF ST. GEORGE,

1 Reubc. C s i ^

Petitioner,

u

vs.
CASE NO. 14692

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, MILLIE 0. BERNARD,
OLOF E. ZUNDELL and JOSEPH C.
FOLLEY, Commissioners of the
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Respondents.

PETITIONER'S BRIEF

REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE
ORDER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH

F. ROBERT REEDER
JOSEPH W. ANDERSON
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner
79 South State Street
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah
84147

G. BLAINE DAVIS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondents
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Fl I E

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

OCT 15 1976
Clerk, Supremo Court, Utah

J

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

CITY OF ST. GEORGE,
Petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, MILLIE 0. BERNARD,
OLOF E. ZUNDELL and JOSEPH C,
FOLLEY, Commissioners of the
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH,

CASE NO. 14692

Respondents.

PETITIONER'S BRIEF

REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE
ORDER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH

F. ROBERT REEDER
JOSEPH W. ANDERSON
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner
79 South State Street
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah
84147

G. BLAINE DAVIS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondents
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 841.14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
NATURE OF THE CASE

1

DISPOSITION BEFORE THE COMMISSION

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

2

ARGUMENTS
I,

THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS UPON THE SCOPE OF
THE AUTHORITY OF DIXIE REA WHEN
DISMISSING FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION
ARE IMPROPER.

POINT II.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ERRED
AS A MATTER OF LAW IN ITS FINDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS THAT THE DIXIE REA
HAS THE RIGHT TO SERVE FUTURE
CUSTOMERS IN THE AREA IN CONFLICT.

11

THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER
OF LAW IN RECEIVING AND CONSIDERING
EVIDENCE OF EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO
THEIR ORDER IN CASE NO. 5663 DATED
JUNE, 1966 IN INTERPRETING THE SCOPE
OF DIXIE'S AUTHORITY.

19

POINT

POINT III.

CONCLUSION

21

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

INDEX OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases
Dixie REA Case No. 5663

Garkane Power Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 98 Utah 466, 100 P.2d 571,
132 A.L.R. 1940 (1940) .

. . . .

Pages

*

2,3,4,5,
6, 7, 8, 13,
14, 18, 19

-

. . . . 11
*

W. S. Hatch Co. v. Public Service Commission,
3 Utah 2d 7, 277 P.2d 809 (1954)

9, 20

Peterson v. Public Service Commission,
1 Utah 2d 324, 266 P.2d 497 (1954)

21

Public Service Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission, 142 Colorado 135,
350 P.2d 543 (1960)

15

Public Utilities Commission v. Home Light &
Power Co., 163 Colorado 72,
428 P.2d 928 (1967)

16

San Miguel Power Association v. Public
Service Commission, 292 P.2d 511,
4 Utah 2d 252 (1956)

11, 18

•

|

Utah Gas Service Co. v. Mountain Fuel Supply,
18 Utah 2d 310, 422 P.2d 530 (1967) . . . . . . .

10

Utah Power & Light Co. v. Empire Electric
Association, 25 Utah 2d 264, 480 P.2d 145
(1971)

9

Western Colorado Power Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission, 163 Colorado 61, 428 P.2d 922
(1967)

17

<

4

Constitution, Statutes and Regulations

*

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953), Sections:
54-4-25, et seq

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2, 3, 12, 15,
18, 22

M

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *
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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an original proceeding upon a Writ of Certiorari
to review an Order of the Public Service Commission of Utah.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The Public Service Commission dismissed for want of
jurisdiction with prejudice the Complaint of the City of St.
George after finding there is a present and future public convenience and necessity to be satisfied and concluding that its
prior Order did not limit Dixie REA to serving only existing
customers, but to the contrary, obligated Dixie REA to serve all
customers, present or future coming into the area.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Petitioner here seeks an Order of this Court reversing
the Order of the Public Service Commission, or, in the alternative,Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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an Order declaring so much of the Order as increases the rights
of Dixie REA of no force and effect.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The City of St. George owns and operates an electric
i
distribution system through which it provides electric service to
the residents of the City.

Over the past several years the City

has annexed several parcels of land contiguous to its city limits
and has extended its electrical distribution system into the
annexed areas to provide electric service to the residents
thereof.

(R. 45, 46, 47.)
A part of the area annexed by the City of St. George is

also included in the area described in the Order of the Public
Service Commission In Dixie REA Case No. 5663.
Exhibit 2 below.)

(R. 46-48,

^

Dixie REA and the City of St. George each

presently service some customers within the area and each seeks
to extend their lines to serve future customers.

(R. 48.)

The

f

extension of electrical distribution facilities by both Dixie REA
and the City of St. George into the same area results in the
duplication of systems.

(R. 83, 84.)

41

Dixie REA is a rural electric cooperative nonprofit
corporation, distributing electric power and energy in certain
areas in Washington County to its members and patrons and is an

^

electric corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.

(R. 100-112, 113.)
By 1965 amendments to § 54-4-25, Utah Code Annotated,

1953 rural electric cooperatives like Dixie REA were made subject
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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*

to the Public Service Commissions jurisdiction and were required
to seek from the Public Service Commission certificates of
convenience and necessity*

The 1965 amendments broadened the

definition of electrical corporations to include cooperatives
serving only their members and added subsections 4 and 5 to
54-4-25.
The 1965 amendments to the Public Utility Act placed
electric cooperatives on equal footing with other electric utilities
and required they seek certificates of convenience and necessity.
Cooperatives other than those applying for a certificate to serve
only customers served on the effective date of the amendments to
the Act had to prove that they were financially capable and that
the public convenience and necessity required their service.
In 1965, Dixie Rural Electric Association filed with
the Utah Public Service Commission an application for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity to operate as a public utility
in an area of Washington County.

The Order of the Commission

upon the application in case No. 5663 is at R. 311.

The Public

Service Commission, in Case No. 5663 by Order dated June 30,
1966, found:
"The Commission finds that the evidence in this record
does not justify the granting of a Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity as requested. This finding
is predicated on the lack of proof of the need or
requirement of electric service in that part of the
proposed service area outside of the old basic area,
and the Berry Springs area, and the unsatisfactory debt
ratio of Dixie."
From its findings the Commission concluded:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"From the foregoing findings the Commission concludes
that the application of Dixie REA for a Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity as set forth in the application and as modified and amended on this record should
be denied. [Emphasis added.]
The Commission further concludes that Dixie has a
statutory right and has lawfully assumed the utility
obligations to serve its customers in its old basic
area and in the area described as Berry Springs Extension Area or Dixie's New Area, and that for clarity
and definiteness, said area should be described in
certificate form with a certificate number by meets and
bounds as set forth in the findings above.

^1

'

4

From its findings and conclusions, the Commission ordered:
"That the application of Dixie REA for a Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity to operate as a public utility
rendering electric service in that part of Washington
County as set forth in the applications and attachments
thereto, and said area that is amended on this record
be and the same is hereby denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Dixie Rural
Electric Association has a statutory right and has
lawfully assumed the utility obligations to serve its
customers in the area described as the Berry Springs
Area or Dixie's New Area, and for clarity and definiteness, Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 1556
is hereby issued to Dixie Rural Electric Association to
operate as a public utility rendering electric service
in an area in Washington County delineated below."
A part of the territory described in this Order of the
Commission was contiguous to the City of St. George, has now been
annexed, and is now served by the City of St. George with electric
power.

(R. 45-48.)

Because of the resulting duplication the

City sought from the Public Service Commission an Order directing
Dixie REA to cease and desist from extending its facilities
without first obtaining a certificate from the Commission and a
franchise from the City.

(R. 49, 51, 84.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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•

Within the limits of the City of St. George, Dixie REA
presently serves more than 10 but less than 20 customers.

These

customers include feed yards, corrals, nomes and naif a dozen or
so pumps.

(R. 136-137.)
Dixie has no franchise from the City of St. George.

(R. 105.)

Dixie had a franchise from Washington County that

authorized use of the public highways outside of the incorporated
limits of the cities and towns in Washington County.

That franchiset

dated June 11, 194 6, expired by its terms June 11, 197 6.

(R. 105,

R. 332.)
Dixie REA holds itself out to provide electric service
to the residents of the annexed areas of the city who are also
within the area described in the Order of the Commission in Dixie
REA in Case No. 5663.

(R. 112.)

Dixie REA will, unless otherwise

ordered by the Public Service Commission, continue to extend its
services within the area.
Following hearing upon the complaint of the City the
Commission found (R. 254):
The Commission finds as to issue No. 2 that Dixie
REA was granted a certificate of convenience and
necessity No. 1556 on June 30, 1966, Exhibit 14. The
area granted to Dixie REA described in metes and bounds
and generally covered that portion of Washington County
surrounding the City of St. George as the city boundaries then existent. The certified area includes two
areas described as "the old area" and the "Berry Springs
area."
Dixie had assumed its responsibilities as a public
utility under the appropriate section of the statute
enacted in 1965, and was serving all customers coming

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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into said areas. At that time, there were about 45
customers, but over the years since 1966 as additional
customers have moved into the area and sought service
Dixie has also served them until in 1975 the customers
totaled 43 9, In reliance on the certificate Dixie has
expanded its facilities to serve the entire area,
increased its plant investment from $129,530.69 in 1967
to $1,800,699.00 in 1975 and increasing its kilowatt
hour usage from 628,722 in 1967 to 12,714,950 in 1975.
. . . From 1966 to present, Dixie's financial
condition has steadily and substantially improved as is
shown by the association's F and S records, Exhibit 9.
This Commission in March, 197 6, in a proceeding wherein
Dixie an increase to its certificated area found that
Dixie had sufficient stability and power sources to
justify the added area certificate and the Commission
reaffirmed its prior findings that Dixie was operating
within an area of certificate serving all customers
coming into the area.
Dixie has since 1966 conducted its operations in
reliance upon the right and obligation to serve all
customers coming into the area and has done so without
opposition from any customer from the City of St. George
or from this Commission. During this period Dixie has
borrowed $1/500,000.00 from the REA with the approval
of this Commission , . . Dixie has served all customers
seeking service and continues to serve the public
seeking service throughout the entire area.
The evidence shows that less than a dozen customers
have been served in the overlap area by the City of
St. George, but in all instances these customers were
already being served by Dixie and were disconnected by
the City or went to the City and did not seek service
from Dixie. There is no evidence to show that Dixie
has failed or refused to serve all seeking service from
the area, in fact Dixie in filing its lawsuits in
Washington County has sought to protect its area and to
prevent the City from serving customers from within the
area certified to Dixie.
Testimony indicated some duplication of facilities,
but the Commission finds that these resulted from the
efforts of the City of St. George in constructing lines
and in serving customers in the certified area which
was already being adequately served by Dixie. The
Commission finds it has no authority to prevent
St. George from effecting said duplication of facilities
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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0

even though such duplication is obviously wasteful and
contrary to the public convenience and necessity.
The Commission finds that the Dixie certificates
of convenience and necessity including No, 155 6 and the
two supplements thereto, Exhibit 18 and Exhibit 22,
clearly do not limit Dixie to serving existing customers,
but in fact to the contrary obligate Dixie to serve all
customers both present and future coming into the area
described in said certificate and needing electric
service.
•

• . .

The Commission further finds that Dixie has clearly
and completely fulfilled its utility obligations under
its certificates in serving the area and all customers
coming into said area and that Dixie is ready, willing
and fully capable of so serving all future customers in
accordance with its certificate and appropriate statutory
requirements. . . . The Commission finds as to issue
No. 2 that Dixie does have a proper certificate of
convenience and necessity authorizing it to serve new
and additional customers within the limits of the City
within its certified area described in Dixie's certificate.
CONCLUSIONS
. . . The Commission further concludes that
Dixie's certificate No. 1556 granted in 1966 as it has
been increased area wise, authorized Dixie to serve all
customers both present and future coming into the
certified area and that Dixie over the years has fully
fulfilled its obligation under proper and adequate
financing, under the proper franchise and with adequate
power and facilities and that Dixie is ready, willing
and capable of doing so in the future. The Commission
further finds that there is a present and future public
convenience and necessity to be satisfied within Dixie's
certified area, and that notwithstanding the overlap of
the City's annexed area, there is no factual or legal
reason for this Commission to curtail Dixie's certificate or its operation with Dixie's certified area and
specifically within the annexed area overlapping into
Dixie's certificate area. The Commission concludes
that the complaint of St. George City should be dismissed.
The Commission is aware of the basic conflicts
between the parties evident in the Washington County
litigation, but concludes that it has no jurisdiction
or authority to resolve those many and complex issues.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the
complaint of St. George City in this matter is hereby
dismissed with prejudice.
I.

i

ARGUMENTS

THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS UPON

*

THE SCOPE OF THE AUTHORITY OF DIXIE REA WHEN DISMISSING
FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION ARE IMPROPER.
The Commission's Order here under review concludes:

*

The Commission concludes that the complaint of the
City of St. George should be dismissed.
The Commission is aware of the basic conflict
between the parties evident in the Washington County
litigation, but concludes that it has no jurisdiction
or authority to resolve those many and complex issues.
[Emphasis ours.]
In spite of its disposition of this case because of a lack of

|

4

authority or jurisdiction to resolve the matters involved, the
Commission found that
"Dixie REA's certificates of convenience and
necessity . . . do not limit Dixie to serving its
existing customers, but in fact, to the contrary,
clearly obligated Dixie to serve all customers, both
present and future coming into the area described in
its certificates and needing electric service there.

•

and concluded
. . . that Dixie's certificate No. 1556 granted in
1966 . . . authorized Dixie to serve all customers,
both present and future coming into its certified area.
•

• •

and
That there is a present and future public convenience
and necessity to be satisfied.
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Neither these findings or conclusions with respect to
the scope of the authority of Dixie REA were necessary to the
disposition of this matter if the Commission was without jurisdiction or authority to "resolve the many and complex issues involved."
This Court has repeatedly instructed the Public Service
Commission not to arrogate into the proceedings and pass upon
matters which were not properly included and presented therein.
Indeed, in Utah Power & Light Co. v. Empire Electric Association,
25 Utah 2d 264, 480 P.2d 145 (1971) where the Commission purported
to redefine the authority of a protestant this Court said:
It was not within the duty or the prerogative of
the Commission to arrogate into the proceedings and
pass upon matters which were not properly included and
presented therein.
The Court proceeded to grant appropriate relief, stating:
In conformity with this doctrine and upon the
basis of the stipulation of the parties it is our
judgment that the plaintiff should prevail to the
extent that we make the following order: Insofar as
the order of the Public Service Commission grants the
application of Empire Electric Association to render
service in accordance with the area described therein,
the order is affirmed; but insofar as it may purport to
go beyond the issue before it and limit or adversely
affect any previously existing rights of Utah Power &
Light Company to render in the rest of San Juan County,
it is of no force and effect.
In an earlier case, W. S. Hatch Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 3 Utah 2d 7, 277 P.2d 809 (1954), this Court held
essentially the same saying:

"Prichard's authority could not be

augmented in this proceeding wherein he appeared only as a
protestant."
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In Utah Gas Service Co, v. Mountain Fuel Supply, 18
Utah 2d 310, 422 P.2d 530 (1967) this Court similarly observed

i

that the safeguarding of the Commission's prerogatives and the
public interest requires that the orders of the Commission be
construed as passing only upon the issues before it.

There the

'

Court said:
The safeguarding of the Commission's prerogatives
and of the public interest requires that its orders be
construed as passing only upon the issues before it;
. . . so that when its authority is properly invoked it
may make such subsequent orders as the public interest
may require.
In the proceedings before the Commission here under
review Dixie REA was a respondent.

.

j

The City complained Dixie was

acting in violation of the law, i.e., without authority from the
Commission.

The Commission dismissed the complaint of the City

of St. George for lack of jurisdiction.

|

Under such circumstances,

the Commission had no duty or prerogative to define the scope of
Dixie's authority.

If the Commission lacked jurisdiction to

!

"resolve those many and complex issues" then its finding and
conclusion on the scope of Dixie's authority ought be of no
force and effect and must not stand.

As we note below, not

*

only are these findings beyond the scope of the issue decided by
the Commission, but also erroneous as a matter of law.
We submit that where the Commission concludes it has no

*

authority or jurisdiction to resolve the issues in this matter,
the Commission's findings and conclusions with respect to the

I
scope of the authority of Dixie REA and the need for such services
must be of no force and effect.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER
OF LAW IN ITS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS THAT THE
DIXIE REA HAS THE RIGHT TO SERVE FUTURE CUSTOMERS
IN THE AREA IN CONFLICT.
Quite aside from the fact that the Commission1s findings
and conclusions upon the scope of Dixie REA's authority was an
improper arrogation, the findings and conclusion are erroneous as
a matter of law.
Nonprofit electric cooperatives serving only their
members were not public utilities and not subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission prior to the 1965 amendments
to the Public Utility statutes.

Garkane Power Co. v. Public

Service Commission, 98 Utah 466, 100 P.2d 571, 132 A.L.R. 1940
(1940); San Miguel Power Association v. Public Service Commission,
292 P.2d 511, 4 Utah 2d 252 (1956). Nonprofit electric cooperatives
and associations were not public utilities because their service
was to members only [consumer owners] and not to the public
generally.

Garkane Power Co. v. Public Service Commission,

supra.
By 1965 amendments to the Public Utility statutes,
nonprofit electrical cooperative associations were made subject
to the Public Service Commission's jurisdiction.

The 1965

amendments broaden the definition of "electric corporation" to
include cooperative associations serving only their members.

As

a result thereof, cooperatives became subject to the prohibitions
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of 54-4-25(1) and were thenceforth required to have a certificate
of convenience and necessity before beginning construction or
operation of any plant or system.

\

Construction or extension of

an electrical plant, except under limited circumstances, required
Commission authority.

^

The 1965 amendment also added subsections (4) and (5)
to Section 54-4-25.

Section 54-4-25(4) provides:

Any supplier of electricity which is brought under
the jurisdiction and regulation of the Public Service
Commission by this Act may file with the Commission an
application for a certificate of convenience and necessity giving the applicant the exclusive right to serve
the customers it is serving in the area in which it is
serving at the time of this filing, subject to the
existing right of other electric corporations to likewise
serve its customers in existence in said areas at said
time. . . . a public hearing may be held to determine
if said applicant has sufficient finances, equipment
and plant to continue its existing service; and the
Commission shall issue its order within 45 days after
such hearing according to the proof submitted at hearing.
Every electric corporation save and except those
applying for a certificate to serve only the customers
served by the applicant on the effective date of this
act applying for such a certificate shall have established a ratio of debt capital to equity capital or
will within a reasonable period of time establish a
ratio of debt capital to equity capital which the
Commission shall find renders the electric corporation
financially stable and which financing shall be found
to be in the public interest. [Emphasis ours.]

4

|

I

*

These sections of 1965 amendments to the Public Utility
Act authorize the Commission to issue grandfather kind of rights

^

to the electrical cooperative associations, i.e. : the right to
serve only the customers (members) served on the effective date
of the Act if the cooperative or association was financially

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

unstable and/or could not prove the public convenience and necessity
required their service.
In 1965 Dixie REA, a nonprofit electrical cooperative,
applied to the Utah Public Service Cornmission for a certificate
of convenience and necessity to operate as a public utility in
certain areas of Washington County, although at the time Dixie's
Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws restricted its service to
members only.

The Commission found in the matter of the application

of Dixie REAf case No. 5663, in its Order dated June 30, 1966,
Exhibit 4 below at Record page 311 et seq, Record page 327:
The Commission finds that the evidence in this
record does not justify the granting of a certificate
of convenience and necessity as requested. This finding
is predicated on the lack of proof of the need or
requirement for electric service in that part of the
proposed service area outside the old service area and
the Berry Springs area and the unsatisfactory debt
ratio of Dixie.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Commission then
concluded:
From the foregoing Findings the Commission concludes
that the application of Dixie Rural Electric Association
for a certificate of convenience and necessity as set
forth in the application and as modified and amended on
the record should be denied. [Emphasis ours.]
The Commission further concludes that Dixie has a
statutory obligation and has assumed a utility obligation to serve its customers in its old basic area and
in the area described as the Berry Springs extension
area or Dixief s new area and that for clarity and
definiteness, said area should be described in certificate form with a certificate number by metes and bounds
as set forth in the following Findings.
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From the foregoing Findings and Conclusions the Commission
ordered:
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the
application of Dixie Rural Electric Association for a
certificate of convenience and necessity to operate as
a utility rendering electric service in that part of
Washington County as set forth in the application and
the attachments thereto, and said application as amended
on the record be and the same is hereby denied•
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, that Dixie
Rural Electric Association has a statutory right and
has lawfully assumed the utility obligations to serve
its customers in its old basic area and in the area
described as the Berry Springs extension area or Dixie's
new area, and for clarity and definiteness, certificate
of convenience and necessity No. 1556 is hereby issued
to Dixie REA to operate as a public utility rendering
electric service in an area in Washington County,
delineated below. [Territorial descriptions omitted.]

(

i

*

* * * * *

In the Order here under review, the Commission found

"

that:
. . . Dixie REA's certificates of convenience and
necessities . . . do not limit Dixie to serving its
existing customers, but in fact, to the contrary,
clearly obligate Dixie to serve all customers, both
present and future coming into the area described in
its certificates and needing electric service.
and concluded:
. . . That Dixiefs certificate No., 1556 granted
in 1966 . . . authorized Dixie to serve all customers
both present and future coming into its certificated
area . .. . .
and;
. . . that there is a present and future public
convenience and necessity to be satisfied . . . .
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We submit these findings and conclusions are in light of 54-425(4) erroneous.
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not been called
upon to interpret Section 4 to Section 54-4-25, Utah Code Ann.
(1953) as amended, the statutory scheme of bringing electrical
cooperatives under Public Service Commission jurisdiction is
similar to that of Colorado.
In Colorado nonprofit electric corporations and electrical
cooperative associations providing electric service to their
members were not utilities subject to the Public Utilities Commission jurisdiction.

In 1960 one nonprofit cooperative corporation,

Union Electric Association, Inc., seeing its territory invaded,
complained to the Public Service Commission of the invasion of
certificated utilities into what it believed was its service area
and applied for a certificate of public convenience and necessity.
The Public Utilities Commission dismissed the complaint of Union
and granted Union the authority to serve only its members and
customers.

The Colorado Supreme Court in Public Service Co. v.

Public Utilities Commission, 142 Colorado 135, 350 P.2d 543
(1960) affirmed in part, saying with respect to the complaint:
In view of the fact that Union had not, at the
time it filed its complaint against Public Service,
acquired public utility status, it was in no position
to complain that Public Service was invading its
service area, for, not being a public utility it had no
service area.
The Public Utilities Commission issued Union a certificate of convenience and necessity to its members and customers in •
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some areas and the Supreme Court affirmed in part the issuance of
such certificate of convenience and necessity limited to serving
members, saying the rural electric associations may not expect to
have an area carved out for them and are entitled to a certificate
only upon proof that public convenience and necessity requires
it. •

In 1961 the Colorado legislature amended the Colorado
Public Utility Laws to define public utilities to include every
cooperative electric association or nonprofit electric corporation
or association supplying electric energy to its members or to the
public.

As a result of the amendment, a number of applications

were filed with the Public Utilities Commission by nonprofit
electrical corporations and electrical cooperatives for certificates
of convenience and necessity.

The Colorado Supreme Court in

Public Utilities Commission v. Home Light & Power Co., 163
Colorado 72, 428 P.2d 928 (1967) ruled in part upon these applications.

The Colorado Supreme Court said in part in affirming the

certificates:
We have already held that a rural electric association may not expect to have a service area carved out
-,.,.. for it from areas already certified to other utilities.
Public Serv. Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 142 Colo. 135,
350 P.2d 543, cert, denied, 364 U.S. 820, 81 S.Ct. 53,
5 L.Ed.2d 50. In such areas "it must find its place
from among the places that remain." In the instant
case, however, we are talking about "the places that
remain." While Poudre Valley should properly be limited,
to serving its then members and customers in prior
certificated areas, yet, as to unserved and uncertificated areas it now stands on the same footing as any
other public utility.
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The court noted that this method used by the Public Utilities
Commission was what may be called "freezing."

Under this solution,

the non-certified utility was upon being certificated limited to
serving its existing customers on the line in question, absent
proof that public convenience and necessity required more.

All

new customers were to be served by the certified utility.
Thus, we see that the Colorado Public Utilities Commission was freezing the service of rural electric cooperatives to
their existing customers when they were not entitled to a certificate of convenience and necessity to serve the area.
The Colorado Supreme Court in Western Colorado Power
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 163 Colorado 61, 428 P.2d 922
(1967) explained this statutory scheme and practice in another
case involving yet another application by a rural electric
cooperative, saying:
We hold that the 1961 act of the legislature did
not destroy the holding of this Court in Public Serv.
Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 142 Colo. 135, 350 P.2d 543,
cert, denied, 364 U.S. 820, 81 S.Ct. 53, 5 L.Ed.2d 50.
The effect of the 1961 act was prospectively to establish electrical co-operatives as public utilities and
to give them a regulated monopoly status as of that
date in those areas in which they were rendering service
on an exclusive basis. The legislative act,, however,
did not purport to affect the contractual rights between
co-operatives and their members which were created at a
time when the co-operatives did not enjoy the status
of public utilities, and thus in the instant action
Delta-Montrose may continue to serve all members who were
receiving service prior to the effective date of its
becoming a public utility, . . . [Emphasis ours.]
Thus, we see the legislative scheme in Colorado in
declaring electric cooperatives to be public utilities was to
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preserve the contractual rights between the cooperatives and
their members as they had historically existed and to freeze the
service to existing members, absent evidence that the public
convenience and necessity required more.
The Utah legislative scheme appears to follow that of
Colorado and was adopted while the Colorado courts were struggling
with their Act.

In Utah as in San Miguel Power Association v.
i

Public Service Commission, supra, this Court held, as Colorado
was to hold later, cooperatives were not utilities and not entitled
to resist the expansion of utilities.

In Colorado, nonprofit

electrical cooperatives were then brought under the jurisdiction
of the Public Service Commission by the amendments to the Public
Utility Act.

Cooperatives were given the opportunity to acquire

a certificate of convenience and necessity to operate as a regulated
monopoly serving an area to the exclusion of all other regulated
utilities under Section (1) of Section 54-4-25, Utah Code Annotated, *
and cooperatives not financially stable and/or able to prove the
public convenience and necessity requires their service were
granted the rights to serve their historic customers—members in

4

respect of their existing contractual rights under Section (4) of
54-4-25, Utah Code Annotated.
We submit that the scope of Dixie's authority from the
Commission's Order in case No. 5663 is clear on its face.
application was denied.

41

Dixie's

The rights of Dixie REA under that Order

are the rights to serve only its customers existing on the
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effective date of the Act and no others.

The findings and con-

clusions of the Commission here under review that its Order in
case No. 5663 did not limit Dixie to serving only existing
customers are therefore as a matter of law erroneous and must
not stand.
III.
THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
RECEIVING AND CONSIDERING EVIDENCE OF EVENTS SUBSEQUENT
TO THEIR ORDER IN CASE NO. 5663 DATED JUNE, 1966
IN INTERPRETING THE SCOPE OF DIXIE'S AUTHORITY.
The Order of which the petitioner here complains is
replete with findings by the Commission of the conduct of Dixie
REA since 1966.

For example, the Commission found that Dixie1s

customers had increased from 45 in 1966 to some 439; that Dixie's
investment had increased from $129,500.00 to $1,800,000.00; that
Dixie's financial condition has steadily and substantially
improved and further that Dixie REA had conducted its operations
upon reliance upon the right and obligations to serve all customers
coming into the area.
Clearly, the Commission has relied upon what Dixie REA
had done since the Commission's Order in case No. 5663 to find
the scope of Dixie's authority.

What Dixie has done since 1966

is neither relevant nor material to the interpretation of the
Order of the Commission in case No. 5663.

Yet the Commission

over objection received:
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Exhibit No, 7, R-pg. 356, a circuit diagram for
the Dixie REA system as it existed in 1967.
Exhibit No, 8, R-pg. 357, a circuit diagram for
the Dixie REA system in 1967 with colored lines which
depict the current scope of the Dixie system.
Exhibit No. 9, R-pg. 358, a compilation of monthly
reports of Dixie REA to the United States Rural Electrification Administration for the years 1966 to 1975.
These reports contain financial and statistical data. •
Exhibit No. 10, R-pg. 377, a compilation of figures
that allegedly show the growth of Dixie REA for the
years 1966 to 1975.
Exhibit No. 11, R-pg. 378, a compilation of figures
that purports to represent the number of work orders
for Dixie REA for the years 1967 to 1975.
Exhibit No. 12, R-pg. 279, a compilation of figures
that purports to express the Utah usage of the Dixie
REA system for the years 1966 to 1975.
The receipt of evidence of the events since 1966 and reliance
i

thereon to interpret Dixie's authority so diseases the Commission's
consideration of this matter that one must conclude as a matter
of law that it was error for the Commission to receive the evidence.
The extent of the authority of Dixie must be found in
the statute authorizing the Commission to Act and within the four
corners of the Commission's Order.

The rights thereunder must be

such as are fairly understood from the import of its language.
W. S. Hatch Co. v. Public Service Commission, 3 Utah 2d 277 P.2d
809 (1954).

The extent of the authority of Dixie REA ought not

be found in the conduct of Dixie REA under the Commission's
Order.
This Court has found on several occasions that unless
there is some uncertainty or ambiguity there is no basis for
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interpretation or clarification of a certificate, because to go
back of the language of the certificate and contradict its plain
meaning would create intolerable confusion and uncertainty would
exist with respect to the operating rights.

See Peterson v.

Public Service Commission, 1 Utah 2d, 324, 266 P.2d 497 (1954).
If to go back of the plain language would create intolerable
confusion and uncertainty with regard to operating rights, then
certainly relying on the conduct of the regulated company involved
since the issuance of those rights to interpret those rights
would lead to the same intolerable confusion and uncertainty.
Indeed, if one's conduct under an Order of the Commission were
the basis for determining the meaning of the Order of the Commission, then economic regulation would be of no significance.

We

submit that the Commission's receipt of Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
and 12 and reliance thereon was error requiring reversal.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that this Court must reverse the
Order of the Public Service Commission or, in the alternative,
declare so much of the Order as increases the operating rights of
Dixie REA of no force and effect.

If the Commission were without

jurisdiction or authority to decide the issues in this matter,
then its findings upon matters over which it had no jurisdiction
to decide cannot stand.
Further, we submit that the findings and conclusions of
the Commission that Dixie REA has the right to serve customers
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other than those existing customers it was serving on the effective
date of the 1965 amendments to the Utah Public Utility Laws are,
as a matter of law, erroneous and cannot stand.

Section 54-4-

25(4) authorized the Commission to allow Dixie REA to continue to
serve its existing customers if it was financially unfit.

The

Commission found Dixie REA to be unfit and by the clear meaning
of its Order granted it the right to serve its existing customers.
Section 54-4-25(4) requires that a financially unstable, nonprofit
electric cooperative or electric corporation be frozen to their
existing customers and the Commission's Order so froze Dixie.
We further submit that the Commission's consideration
of this matter was so tainted by its receipt and consideration of
totally irrelevant and immaterial matters relating to the operation of Dixie* REA since the Commission's Order in 1966 that it
must be reversed.
DATED this / C ^ day of October, 1976.
Respectfully submitted,

^F. ROBERT REEDER
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner
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